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Resumo
Reequilibrando a Parceria Transatlântica
Duas publicações recentes – um pequeno livro de
Edward Balladur e um relatório de cinco antigos 
comandantes da NATO – chegam a um diagnós-
tico comum: os recentes desenvolvimentos inter-
nacionais evidenciam a necessidade de uma reno-
vação da relação da Europa e Estados Unidos, uma 
vez que a sua ausência afectaria negativamente 
os interesses de ambos.
Aqui, comentam-se dois aspectos desta argumen-
tação. Primeiro, a janela de oportunidade de reno-
vação das relações transatlânticas poderá estar 
limitada às duas próximas décadas. Segundo, é 
necessário reequilibrar a relação no sentido de 
uma maior igualdade entre os seus membros.
Abstract
Edward Balladur’s recent short book, and a report 
by fi ve former NATO commanders, both reach 
broadly similar diagnoses, namely that recent world 
developments call for a renewal of the relationship 
between Europe, and the United States because they 
adversely affect the interests of both of them.
Two aspects of their arguments are commented
upon on this occasion. First is the possibility that 
the timeframe of opportunities for renewing the 
relationship in the next two decades. Second is the 
importance of rebalancing that relationship in the 
direction of greater equality.
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Two recent documents deserve the attention of all students and practitioners of 
transatlantic relations and global security. Eduard Balladur’s proposal for a ‘Union 
of the West”1 offers a masterly analysis of the contemporary situation, and a succinct 
but well-aimed list of solutions for reinvigorating a partnership that has tended 
to fray as it came to be taken for granted. A report by fi ve high-ranking NATO 
commanders from Europe and the United States2 refl ects parallel preoccupations, 
albeit on a more practical level but issues similarly strong calls for “renewing the 
transatlantic relationship”.
Rather than entering upon a full-scale review of a pair of substantial documents, 
this paper is designed to make two specifi c points: to highlight the fact that the 
authors of both of them arrive at a broadly similar diagnosis of to-day’s conditions: 
the world is changing fast and has – past a decade of post-cold war self-satisfaction 
– moved into a new phase – in a way that threatens to affect adversely, and in equal 
measure, the interests of both Europe and the United States. Balladur, a former 
French Prime Minister, fears that recent developments are setting in motion not 
just the “marginalization” but even possibly the “rejection” of the West, and he 
points in particular to the rise of China and India, and the return of Russia. The 
generals write of the “climate of uncertainty” in global politics, and set as the goal 
of “grand strategy” for the West the “restoring of “certainty” without which “there 
will be nothing”. ‘Certainty’ will be the product of a “zone of common security and 
common action from Finland to Alaska” created by an improved use of existing 
institutions such as NATO, and the EU.
In relation to these important arguments let us consider just two sets of 
comments. The fi rst concerns timing, and time frame, and argues that change is 
timely, and possible; the second examines the issue of revitalizing the partnership, 
in particular by means of “rebalancing” it, on the major premise that, over the 
long span of decades that lie ahead, the development of a condition of equality 
between the United States and Europe is a necessary (but not suffi cient) condition 
of its long-run viability.
 1 Eduard Balladur, Pour une Union occidentale entre Europe et les Ėtats-Unis, Paris: Fayard 2007,
120 pp.
 2 “Toward a grand strategy for an uncertain world: Renewing the transatlantic partnership” 
(2007), 150 pp, A report by General Klaus Nauman (Germany), Field Marshal Inge (UK), General
John Shalikashvili (USA), Admiral Jack Lanxade (France), and General Henk van den Breemen 
(Netherlands), (with the advice i.a. of Gen. Brent Snowcroft). Text available on : www.csis.
org/media/csis/events/080110_grand_strategy.pdf
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The Next Two Decades
It has become increasingly evident that the window of opportunity for renewing 
US-Europe relations is now, both for tactical and for strategic reasons. The conditions 
that favor such initiatives include, besides gathering storm clouds all round, the 
new EU constitution (the Lisbon Treaty) that (when it comes into force) would 
mean a full-time President, with a tenure of two and half years, renewable, and a 
High Representative (foreign minister), two posts that could strengthen the EU’s 
capacity for global action A signifi cant change in the situation might already have 
occurred with the election of a new French President, Nicolas Sarkozy (to whom 
Balladur is close) who is making ready for France’s reentry into NATO’s integrated 
military framework, hence a possible change for the strategic context in the long 
term. In the United States, the new Obama Administration might offer yet other 
opportunities.
Balladur reminds us that ‘to-day, American leadership might be thought to be 
indispensable’, but that ‘soon’, it might no longer be so: “in less than twenty years, 
in fact, what changes [there will occur] in relative power!”3. Twenty years might 
sound like a long time, but not in global politics.
This also reminds us that global politics is not a static, frozen, unchanging 
system, nor is it a steam of random events but rather a patterned, or phased, 
process, in which structural changes can be traced, and also anticipated. Students 
of this fi eld4 propose that driving politics at the global level since the 15th century 
has been a competition for leadership at the global level (not unlike the kind of 
competition for offi ce that animates national politics, timed by electoral campaigns). 
That competition has been punctuated by generation-long global wars at intervals 
of just over 100 years. (for an average interval of 108 years between the onset of 
four such wars, with the most recent – 1792 to 1914 – of 122 years).
These global wars, in turn selected the occupants of the informal ‘offi ce’ of global 
leadership. First Portugal, and then the Dutch Republic laid the early groundwork 
for this development, whereupon Britain, over the next two “cycles” constructed, 
and executed, the mature form of that institution. The United States succeeded to 
 3 Balladur, p.107: “…sans leadership américaine …on ne peut réussir grand chose; il est donc 
indispensable. C’est vrai aujourd’hui, mais bientôt ne le sera plus. Avant vingt ans, en effet, 
quels changements dans les rapports de puissance!”.
 4 See i.a. G. Modelski Long Cycles in World Politics, London: Macmillan 1987; W.R. Thompson 
On Global War. Columbia: South Carolina U.P. 1988; G. Modelski “Two Lectures on World 
Politics”, Lisboa: Academia de Marinha: 1996; T. Devezas and G. Modelski “The Portuguese 
as System-builders” in Globalization as Evolutionary Process; London: Routledge 2008.
 143 Nação e Defesa
Rebalancing the Transatlantic Partnership
it in the 20th century not just by replaying the experience of Britain but by raising 
the bar of this role, and setting in motion an evolutionary move toward higher 
levels of global organization. The next phase of that move will be the stuff of 21st 
century global politics.
The qualifi cations for global leadership have been forces of global reach including 
sea power; economic innovation, open society and sponsorship of the wining 
coalition of global war. Those falling behind in that competition – the challengers 
– including Spain, France, and Germany – deployed powerful land forces and 
featured large but non-innovative economies, and closed societies, and failed in 
coalition-building.
The ‘big’ questions for students of global politics have been these: who will fi ll 
the offi ce of global leadership or some variant of it later in this century, and will 
competition for global leadership once again be decided by global war (we shall 
soon observe – in 2014 – the centenary of the start of the most recent such event) 
or will global institutional evolution make it possible to avoid such an outcome?5 
Many should like to think the latter – citing globalization and the destructive power 
of nuclear weapons – but students of world affairs cannot completely exclude the 
former, by assigning to it a probability of zero. In any event, in the ‘soon’ horizon 
proposed by Baladur – some twenty years – this raises important questions.
For global wars have not been the only evidence of regularity. Global politics 
also shows ‘phasing’, that is changes in characteristic behavior over time, governed 
by generational turnover at intervals of some 20-30 years. Since the end of the last 
global war period in 1945, we can distinguish three such phases. Initially, there 
was the establishment of a post-war order around the leadership role of the United 
States. In the next phase, some aspects of that order, in particular the cold war and 
the East European 1945 settlement lose salience, and new global problems begin to 
register new claims to a place on the global agenda such as the threat of nuclear 
weapons, and their proliferation, democratization, as well as climate change. Since 
2000 global politics has been moving into the phase of deconcentration, evidenced 
by the rise of China and India, and the drain on America’s standing and resources 
i.a. by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and by fi nancial problems.
But that is also the phase of coalition-building in anticipation of a renewal of 
competition for global leadership. Opportunities have opened up for assembling 
and re-assembling coalitions that will, in the “soon” horizon of two-three decades, 
contend for a renewal of global leadership around reprogrammed agendas. The 
 5 See also “The evolution of global politics” at http://faculty.washington.edu/modelski/
evoglopol.html
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phase of coalition-building has about two more decades to run, and Balladur’s 
estimate might be just about right. Within an emerging democratic community, that 
might well prove to be the timeframe for the optimal management of a renewal of 
the transatlantic partnership.
All this makes it clear that renewing the transatlantic relation on a durable 
foundation is a matter not just of tactical opportunity, and of the strategic
dangers now becoming apparent to the naked eye, but is also sustained by a 
basic analysis of the global processes at work that indicate the approach of major 
tensions.
Why Re-balancing?
Most generally, let us stipulate that an essential condition of the success of 
Balladur’s proposed, ‘more perfect’, union is the emergence of a balance (as of 
equals) between the United States and Europe. Clearly, no single European state 
can hope to equal the United States’ global stature. But there was also a time 
when French leaders thought they might be the leaders of Europe that would be 
one of the great powers in a multipolar world, in an image favored i.a. by former 
President Jacques Chirac. That strategy of confronting, or checking US power has 
not succeeded. Balladur discards this notion and urges Europe to stand together 
with the United States in facing an uncertain world, to forestall a decline that 
menaces the entire West.
Why a balance of equals? Because in the long run, and in a changing world, a 
balanced structure is the one most likely in the long run to be viable: fairer, more 
fl exible and adaptable, and sturdy enough to weather crises. Balance refers to the 
distribution of authority and power within a system; unbalanced structures, such 
as power monopolies, imperial constructs, autocracies, or single party systems, 
tend to produce undesirable and/or unfair outcomes that undermine stability. 
The sovereign equality of states is one of the basic principles of international law. 
Balance (embodying ‘checks and balances’) is a structural requirement of democratic 
institutions.6
These are weighty considerations but there is one important caveat to be 
entered into this discussion. Innovative products and services for a time create by 
 6 In the classic defi nition, democracy is ‘equality under law’. We can then argue that in interna-
tional relations, “the good functioning of a system of rules is dependent upon a power balance 
between the actors of a system of states” L. Levi Federalist Thinking, Lanham: University Press 
of America, 2008, 141.
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their very nature as novelties a condition of monopoly for those originating them. 
Successful inventors and innovators create valued ‘brands’ that yield important 
(albeit temporary) advantages. In that sense, the United States global leadership, 
and in NATO, have stood, after 1945, as high-quality innovations in world politics, 
with a wide range of positive effects, avoiding for a signifi cant length of time the 
negative consequences of the imbalances then created. But all innovations fade in 
time, and that process is also likely to be at work in the transatlantic partnership, 
if that is unattended to.
From an earlier condition of inequality, some conditions of balance are now
in place. The European Union has a population larger (500m) than the US (300m),
also a larger GDP, a greater share of world trade, and the world’s biggest 
development assistance budget. Indeed in economic matters the EU stands 
strong, and a condition of equality now prevails i.a. in world trade talks and 
in anti-trust matters. The (US-EU) Transatlantic Economic Council (established 
in 2007) now directs economic cooperation. Balladur proposes to build on these 
foundations a transatlantic common market (elements of which had already begun 
to be put in place in the Transatlantic Market program), possibly retracing on an 
intercontinental scale the steps that some half-century ago launched what is now 
the European Union.
Europe also has serious military potential, a space program, and in the UK, 
and France, experience of global operations, and two basic nuclear arsenals, 
but a total of defense expenditures only about one-half of the United States. It 
lacks a coherent military doctrine, lags in technological sophistication, and its 
overall posture is viewed as weak In consequence, NATO has ‘traditionally’ been 
dominated by the United States, and recent years of ‘unilateralism’ have only 
compounded that problem.
Does ‘equality’ mean actually mean some formal identity of political infl uence 
or military power? Not in a partnership that commonly involves a division of 
functions and responsibilities under an overall concept of common interests, 
continuously reviewed. Thus for the European Union that might mean greater 
(but not exclusive) commitments to the Mediterranean, the Black Sea and the Baltic 
areas, while for the US the emphasis could be on the Pacifi c and Indian Oceans. 
Nor is it right to argue that a fuller military potential of the EU is many decades 
away from realization, given the past half-century’s experience that opened with 
the 1954 defeat of the European Defense Community project for a European army. 
If and when a need arises, and is perceived as urgent, then the response could very 
well be swift. The fi rst seeds of a European defense capacity were sown in 1999 
with the launch of a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) that is focused 
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in the fi rst lace on humanitarian and crisis management tasks. The European Rapid 
Reaction Force (conceived as up to a dozen ‘battle groups’ of some 1,500 troops 
each) was declared partially operational in 2004.7 Combined with the accumulated 
resources of NATO’s infrastructure this could be rapidly expanded if the need 
for it arose. The basic premise of Balladur’s argument is that such a need is now 
appearing on the horizon.
NATO has, of course been for the past half-century notable for being steered 
by the United States, and in its inner councils, by a US-UK alignment, the “special 
relationship’, one of the effects of World War II, and early American preference 
for a British leadership role in West European defense; yet soon the building of 
‘Europe” was driven by a Franco-German partnership. But can both NATO, and 
the transatlantic relationship as a whole, become more balanced? Robert Kaplan, 
for one, seems to reject this possibility outright, arguing that “NATO cannot be an 
alliance of equals”. But he then injects a longer-term consideration: “that does not 
mean that it won’t play a signifi cant role in our grand strategy: to create a web of 
global arrangements and liberal institutions that will allow America to gradually 
retreat from its costly and risky position of overbearing domination”.8 In other 
words, what Kaplan still sees to-day is inequality but he also admits that, given 
new world conditions, such a structure is both costly and risky. David Calleo 
points out that “as a military superpower with a taste for global management, 
the United States particularly requires foreign as well as domestic balancing”.9 
Domestic balancing requires a ‘division of powers”. ‘Foreign balancing” means 
balancing with Europe.
Both reports show awareness of this problem (though the generals’ is less explicit). 
In the institutional realm, Balladur proposes the creation of an Executive Council 
composed of the Presidents of the United States, and the European Union, backed 
by a permanent secretariat, to meet quarterly (as does the European Council), and to 
harmonize policies via consultations on all pending problems. Such an arrangement 
would clearly signal a partnership of equals, provided all important questions, and 
 7 The Nordic battle group, led by Sweden, was ready in January 2008. Cf. the Autumn-Winter 2007 
issue of Nação e Defesa for the role of small and medium states. Currently the EU is running or 
planning 12 ESDP operations, mostly small police or rule-of-law missions (including Kosovo), 
also searching for a connection to the US, as in Volker Heise “The ESDP and the Transatlantic 
Relationship”, Stiftung Wissenschaft Politik Resarch Paper November 2007. In September 2008, 
EU Foreign Ministers approved a ‘coordination unit’ to plan for naval anti-pirate missions in 
the Gulf of Aden.
 8 Robert D. Kaplan, “Equal alliance, unequal roles” New York Times Op-Ed page, March 27, 
2008.
 9 David P. Calleo “The unipolar illusion” Survival Autumn 2007, 73-78.
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especially those of global security, were on the table. Annual Presidential summits 
have, of course, been the practice in US-EU relations since 1990 – albeit with modest 
results. Perhaps a higher frequency of meeting (while adding to an already busy 
schedule of offi cial meetings), combined with new constitutional arrangements 
(for the EU, yet to be realized), with new occupants of key positions, and a new 
doctrine, might make a difference.
The generals suggest a more complex arrangement, one that would join together 
the US-EU, and the NATO processes, via the formation of a US-EU-NATO “steering 
directorate at the highest political level”, to coordinate response to crises, to agree 
who should take the lead, and to ensure mutual support. It might also help to 
introduce long-term problems such as climate change into the practical arena.
That arrangement would tie the EU directly in with NATO as such, and not just
via individual members. By bringing in the EU into the nexus of linkages, a
broader basis for more balanced cooperation might emerge. The insertion of
NATO into an US-EU relationship would strengthen US influence but make 
a transition more viable. If successful it would serve as platform for other 
ventures, and make plain that the European Union and NATO are not rivals 
but complementary.
Both Balladur’s and the generals’ suggestions might be labeled as “largely 
symbolic”, as generating favorable imagery but lacking in real substance. We would 
maintain that it is unwise to minimize the role of symbols for they clarify, and help 
to shape, reality. That is why even an initially symbolic change might help to push 
developments into an increasingly balanced direction. 
At the end of the day, what might matter most is the movement of the global 
system beyond what political leaders might have intended or planned. Over the next 
decade or two, events such as wars without end, severe fi nancial crises, or natural 
disasters, might do more for rebalancing than the designs of men, and women. But 
that does not mean that they should not be thinking about it. That, too, means that 
prudence calls for being prepared for a variety of contingencies.
Additionally, US support for greater equality would also be crucial. For some 
might argue that a Europe of nation-states might be easier to infl uence in a sense 
favorable to US interests than a Europe that speaks with one voice (a classic case 
was Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld’s appeal, on the eve of the Iraq war, to the 
“New Europe’; it divided NATO, and yielded scant support). But others might 
respond that policies of ‘divide-and-rule are alien to American notions of equality 
and fairness. A divided Europe might moreover be exposed to the same treatment 
from other directions, for example, from Russia on issues of energy supplies. Such 
arguments tend to point Europe further in a federalist direction.
Rebalancing the Transatlantic Partnership
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A New Transatlantic Bargain?
That “no nation and no institution is capable of dealing with current and future 
problems on its own” – is a truism that tended to be forgotten in the heady days 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union; and the generals take it as the premise of 
their argument. In fact, the practice of earlier world powers including Britain, or 
the Dutch Republic, and earlier, Portugal, has been to maintain strong bilateral 
cooperative arrangements. For Portugal, the crucial relationship was that with Spain, 
fi rst cemented by the Treaty of Tordesillas (1494 that partitioned the world’s ocean 
spaces between them). For the Dutch Republic it was the alliance with England, 
fi rst formalized in the Nonesuch Treaty (1585), and later known as that of the two 
“maritime powers”. The United States too, through much of the 20th century, were 
on particularly close terms with Britain, in a ‘special’ relationship that only gradually 
shifted over time from near parity toward inequality. 
So the notion of close coordination at the global level is not really foreign to the 
practice of global leadership, and has at various times been conducted as between 
equals. In current practice it means, in the fi rst place, discontinuing the recent US 
preference for unilateralism, and in the second place, jointly taking stock of, and 
responding to, common problems, avoiding opportunities for springing surprises, 
and above all, in Balladur’s words, “parler d’égal à égal avec L’Union”: “the United 
States cannot pretend to decide alone on behalf of all”10. In diplomatic practice, it 
also means a new strategic bargain, in which France returns to NATO, and the 
United States drops its objections to European defense initiatives.
Balladur is well aware that partnership is always two-sided, and calls for 
comparable contributions from both sides. He urges Europe to make the necessary 
efforts to be independent, and in particular in the military area. But he also sees 
the French nuclear force as the core of independent European security because 
“la force anglaise n’a pas l’autonomie suffi sante” on account of its relation to the 
United States.11 That observation raises an interesting question and opens up an 
area that calls for much clarifi cation and more discussion. Is France alone to be the 
core of an ‘independent’ European force? Would that not create a French nuclear 
monopoly for questions of high strategy?
10 Balladur, pp.76,10.
11 Ibid., p.97; the US-UK (Roosevelt-Churchill) Quebec Agreement of August 1943 is listed by the 
U.S. Department of State on its website as “in force”: as of November 1, 2007, on www.state.gov/
documents/organization/83043.pdf (accessed November 14, 2008). See also J. Baylis Anglo-Ame-
rican Defense Relations 1939-1980: The Special Relationship, New York: St.. Martin’s, 1981, 36-7.
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By the Quebec Agreement of August 19, 1943, the United States and the United 
Kingdom pledged “never to use” the nuclear weapon “against each other” and 
“never to use it against a third party without each other’s consent”. There was 
also provision for a Canadian role. While amended and reinterpreted since, this 
agreement has been at the basis of long-lasting US-UK nuclear cooperation, and 
the spirit of it remains intact. Might not this arrangement be extended, in the fi rst 
place, to France, serving as a basis for higher strategic cooperation?
This is an area that calls for debate because including a possible global war in 
the planning horizons makes the nuclear question more urgent. But neither Ballladur 
nor the former NATO commanders seem ready to envisage a world without nuclear 
arms – a position that is now urged by a number of other former high government 
offi cials, both in Europe and in the United States (prominently including i.a. Henry 
Kissinger, and Sam Nunn). A nuclear-free world is more likely to weather safely a 
period of intense global competition that we seem to be heading for. 
Either way, if the EU is to be independent, equal, and to have a grand strategy, 
it needs to be prepared for greater, riskier, and more costly, efforts in response to 
the dangers that loom over the horizon.
The Outlook
A ‘Union of the West” is not an end-in-itself. It needs to be open, and would 
serve as an operating, or active, nucleus of an emerging democratic community 
that is potentially world-wide, and that early in the 21st century already holds a 
majority position in the world at large. In that respect it might be likened to the role 
Virginia and Massachusetts played in the formative decades of the United States, 
and that France and Germany assumed, after 1950, in launching programs aimed 
at European unity. In close but loosely structured cooperation such partnerships 
served as a “motor” of community-formation and institution-building.12
A balanced and effective transatlantic partnership, a Union of the West, or a 
Transatlantic Union, might likely become the nucleus of an open, wider, democratic 
community. Other countries, from all parts of the world, could be expected to choose 
to be more closely associated with it. A balanced nucleus is also an indispensable 
condition of its future stability because a wider community, if it is to endure, must 
12 More recently, the EU-3 (Britain, France and Germany) became prominent in the Iranian nuclear 
crisis. The EU-3 is also sometimes referred to as the ‘directorate”; it may sponsor policy changes 
but does not issues “directives”.
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be a fair and democratic one. The view that the transatlantic relationship needs to 
be brought into the 21st century by means of a stronger European Union, a stronger 
NATO and a stronger, more seamless relationship between them, is gaining ground, 
and in the United States too.13
In federative enterprises, “dangers from foreign arms and infl uence”14 are the 
principal motive force for union, and override divisions inherent in democratic 
diversity. Such was the case in the formation of Switzerland, the foundation of the 
United States of America, in the creation of Canada (1867), and of Australia (1902). We 
might expect “foreign dangers” to work in similar fashion in the present case.
That is why we might need to observe future developments in this matter as 
operating on two levels. In Europe itself, a movement toward higher forms of 
political organization, generally in a federalist direction, is the sine qua non of 
effective rebalancing, and hence also of an effective posture in a rapidly changing 
international system. At the US-Europe level, the movement toward a Union of 
the West makes possible the revitalization of a long-standing relationship, and a 
stronger bonding. That is how this complex federative impulse might work itself 
out. Parallel positive developments at both these levels will make it likely that such 
a relationship will turn out to be timely, balanced, and enduring.
13 The US Ambassador to NATO spoke in this vein in Paris, and in London in February 2008, 
also declaring that Europe, the United States, NATO, and “the democratic world”, needed “a 
stronger, more capable European defense capacity”.
14 The Federalist, No.3; the fi rst four of the substantive Federalist papers were given to “foreign 
dangers” as grounds for union.
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